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Abstract 
This paper addresses the question of delegation of morality to a machine, through a consideration of 
whether or not nonhumans can be considered to be moral. The aspect of morality under considera-
tion here is protection of privacy. The topic is introduced through two cases where there was a fail-
ure in sharing and retaining  personal data protected by UK data protection law, with tragic conse-
quences. In some sense this can be regarded as a failure in the process of delegating morality to a 
computer database. In the UK, the issues that these cases raise have resulted in legislation designed 
to protect children which allows for the creation of a huge database for children. Paradoxically, we 
have the situation where we failed to use digital data in enforcing the law to protect children, yet we 
may now rely heavily on digital technologies to care for children.  I draw on the work of Floridi, 
Sanders, Collins, Kusch, Latour and Akrich, a spectrum of work stretching from philosophy to soci-
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ology of technology and the “seamless web” or “actor-network” approach to studies of technology.  
Intentionality is considered, but not deemed necessary for meaningful moral behaviour. Floridi’s 
and Sanders’ concept of “distributed morality” accords with the network of agency characterized by 
actor-network approaches. The paper concludes that enfranchizing nonhumans, in the shape of 
computer databases of personal data, as moral agents is not necessarily problematic but a balance of 
delegation of morality must be made between human and nonhuman actors. 
 Keywords  
Privacy, delegation, artificial agents,  intentionality, distributed morality, actor-network theory, data 
protection law 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Can morality, and in particular, privacy, be delegated to a machine or must it remain a purely human 
attribute? If we decide that we can delegate it to a machine, can we distribute aspects of morality 
through the network of machine and human in a balanced way?  
   In particular, I look at an example of delegation of morality where privacy is the central moral 
concern; the question of delegating morality to a database and how this continues to be achieved, 
successfully or otherwise, through the application of data protection law. This is considered in  a 
past tragic case (Soham murders). One way of analysing key aspects of the case involves invoking a 
failure in the delegation of morality to a machine, where an appropriate approach to privacy was not 
achieved. However I suggest that some responses to this case (and the similarly tragic Climbie 
case), in terms of calls for the construction of a national database for children in the UK, can be read 
in terms of further attempts to delegate morality to a machine, despite the failures signalled by these 
tragic cases. I argue that we need to think carefully about the conditions where we would want to 
perform such a delegation and their implications. This is clearly complex and the examples to which 
I allude, suggest that we do not entirely understand the implications of the delegations we currently 
perform. The paper opens with a description of the Soham and Climbie cases, set against a consid-
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eration of UK data protection legislation, and the responses of the UK government in terms of its 
legislation to construct a national database for children. The concerns that prompt the calls for such 
a  database are echoed in popular responses to protect children using microchip  tracking devices. 
This is followed by a consideration of how moral agency, particularly concerning privacy could be 
part of a database, as opposed to treating the design and implementation of such a database in a 
purely instrumental way. This opens up a consideration of  how delegations of morality might be 
treated theoretically. In formulating an  analysis of such delegations three approaches are relevant; 
those of Floridi and Sanders, Collins and Kusch, Akrich and Latour1. The question of intentionality, 
which has beset philosophical critiques of artificial intelligence when delegation of intelligence is 
considered, is discussed but not found to be relevant Instead, the concept of distributed morality, 
articulated by Floridi and Sanders but lent support from Akrich and Latour appears to be an appro-
priate approach for analysing the moral role  of information and communications technologies. 
 
THE UK DATA PROTECTION ACT- SOHAM AND CLIMBIE CASES 
The Data Protection Act (DPA) became law in the UK in 1984 and was subsequently superseded by 
the 1998 Data Protection Act which broadened the scope of the original act from just digital media 
to include data held by any means of storage including paper. That it was revised relatively quickly 
from its original form is an indication of how quickly our ethical and legal judgments must move in 
response to the use of computer technologies and how much our understanding of key concepts such 
                                                           
1 L. Floridi and J.W. Sanders. On the Morality of Artificial Agents. Minds and Machines, 14(3): 349—379, 
2004. H.M. Collins and M. Kusch. The Shape of Actions: What Machines and Humans Can Do. MIT Press, 
Cambridge, MA and London, 1998. M. Akrich. The De-Scription of Technical Objects. In W.E. Bijker and J. 
Law, editors,  Shaping Technology/Building Society: Studies in Sociotechnical Change, pages 205—224, MIT 
Press, Cambridge, MA and London, 1997. B. Latour. Where are the Missing Masses? The Sociology of a Few 
Mundane Artifacts. In W.E. Bijker and J. Law, editors, Shaping Technology/Building Society: Studies in 
Sociotechnical Change, pages 225-258, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA and London, 1997. 
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as privacy are shaped by our use of new technologies. The DPA’s application to personal data and 
its subsequent amendment to apply to non-computerized data serves to underline the way that new 
technologies, with their moral implications, quickly become entwined in our social existence.  
   The UK DPA applies to personal data and this recognizes that individual data privacy is important 
and must be protected and that individuals have a right to know what data is held on them, with the 
concomitant right to have the data changed if it is in error. Importantly, personal data should not be 
held longer than is necessary.  
   Two tragic, high profile cases which have arisen in the UK in the last five years illustrate what can 
go wrong and where our moral intuition that the need to protect children is paramount is not re-
flected in the application of data protection law in protecting personal data. The common features of 
these cases relate to the way that they involve vulnerable members of society, in this case young 
children, whose need for protection and just treatment is uncontroversial. Secondly, both cases in-
volve a failure to share personal data, about certain of the individuals involved, with other appropri-
ate agents who might have ensured their protection, signalling, to a greater or lesser extent a failure 
to understand and apply data protection law appropriately.  
   Although, in general, personal data about individuals must not be shared with other organizations, 
there are exemptions for potential criminal activity, terrorism and the protection of vulnerable peo-
ple. This is an important extension of the concept of privacy, one that is intended to be captured by 
data protection legislation, but which was not implemented appropriately in these cases. A major 
part of the concept of privacy involves informational privacy or the right to have information about 
oneself remain confidential2. Much, but not all, of the scope of data protection involves the protec-
tion of informational privacy. However, it is clear that there will be times when protecting the in-
formational privacy of one individual might lead to a violation of decisional privacy i.e. the freedom 
to make and act upon one’s own decisions without interference, or even physical privacy or freedom 
                                                           
2 A.L. Allen. Privacy. In A. M. Jaggar and I. M. Young, editors, A Companion to Feminist Philosophy, pages 
456—465. Blackwell, Malden, MA and Oxford, 1998. 
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of unwanted physical observation or bodily contact or invasion The UK DPA allows for normal 
informational privacy of an individual to be abrogated if a crime may be committed. In these cases, 
the crime involved was the worst example of violation of physical privacy, namely murder. 
   Victoria Climbie was sent by her parents in Nigeria to live with an aunt in the UK, in the hope of 
securing a better life for her. She lived a life of unspeakable cruelty at the hands of her aunt and died 
in 2000 at the age of eight. Although she was known to the social services and several other authori-
ties, at least part of the reason for this tragic outcome, was the failure to share personal data about 
her amongst the various authorities. 
   In August 2002, two ten-year old girls were murdered in the village of Soham in Humberside in 
North East England. Their murderer was Ian Huntley, the caretaker at the girls’ school and there-
fore, to them, a trusted adult. When the case was brought to trial it transpired that he had been sub-
ject to a series of charges of rape, indecent assault and underage sex between 1995 and 1999. When 
he was employed by Soham College, the mandatory pre-employment checks were made but the 
details of these past complaints were not uncovered, hence he was employed by the school. In the 
belief that the DPA obliged them to delete the files, Humberside Police had erased them3. 
   Without simplifying the complexities of these two tragic cases, there are important similarities. 
Their overall similarity involves a failure of appropriate organizations to retain and/or share per-
sonal data in circumstances where the normal expectation of privacy of personal data should be set 
aside because potential harm to vulnerable people was involved. The DPA clearly allows protection 
of data to be overridden where a crime might be involved. In the Climbie case up to 14 different 
authorities, including hospitals and social services, were involved before her death. Lack of data 
sharing was a clear issue here. In the Soham case it appears that lack of appropriate data retention 
was a serious issue.  
                                                                                                                                                                 
 
3 S. Room. Meeting the Challenges of the Victoria Climbie & Soham Cases, http://www.dpalaw.info available 
online, accessed 23rd March, 2005, 2004. 
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   Without wishing in any way to trivialize the tragedy of these cases, both involve, in some senses a 
delegation to a nonhuman i.e. to a database. The database does not work on its own – the whole 
moral network of database plus police and/or social workers, education and health officials, those 
who could have kept the data, passed it on, interrogated it and shared it, failed to work. So it is not 
enough to delegate aspects of morality to a database, the morality of the network must be distributed 
through human and nonhuman agents (the database). The different ways in which such a delegation 
and distribution of morality may be theorized is the subject of the theoretical part of the paper be-
low. 
   This also serves to demonstrate that not all delegations of morality to nonhumans are equal. Some 
are much more direct and the moral action they demand back of humans is clear. Modern cars “de-
mand” that you apply your seatbelt before driving off through lights and alarms. They have one 
moral imperative: “Buckle up!” although there are other secondary moral imperatives such as “obey 
the law and be aware of your own safety and that of others”, which one is addressing through the 
activity of fastening the seatbelt. However a database does have the singular moral immediacy of 
a seat belt. The potential of functioning of a database is clearly much more complex. 
   On one hand there might be a temptation to treat a database in a purely instrumental way, as a 
repository of data. However the examples above show that there will be circumstances where an 
instrumental approach to data in a database will not suffice. From the swift development of subject 
areas such as data mining, the notion that there are latent associations and relationships, and even 
new knowledge which can be mined out of a database suggests that, by analogy, we may be able to 
mine the moral relationships which are latent in a database. 
   We can see how morality can be distributed throughout a network of humans and nonhuman in 
some of the measures which were introduced, in UK legislation, in the wake of Victoria Climbie’s 
tragic death, culminating in the Children’s Bill which was passed by the British parliament in 
March, 2004. One of the bill’s most revolutionary aspects is the provision for the creation of a na-
tional database for children (under the age of 18) and the appropriate provision for tracking, referral 
and data sharing. Of the 11 million or so children of that age group in the UK, 50-100 children per 
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annum die of abuse or neglect. To some extent this move suggests that we are devolving aspects of 
childcare to the database but there is a clear understanding that a wraparound of referral, data shar-
ing and tracking is required. In other words we apparently recognize the need for distributing moral-
ity through the network of humans and non-humans. The question then remains as to how much 
moral work we require of our nonhumans, i.e. the database and computers, and, like the much more 
obvious seat belt, how much moral work they require of us. 
A DATABASE FOR CHILDREN  
A number of implications run from the implementation of a children’s database. First of all, we must 
consider the split between public and private worlds and how to handle the ethical dilemmas that 
often follow from this split. This raises one of the fundamental disjunctions of liberal politics, 
namely the split between the public sphere of work and government and the private sphere of home 
and family4. Bringing up children is often seen as a private matter where the state is reluctant to step 
in. But the recognition that abuse and/or neglect often occurs in the private sphere of the home gives 
the state the right to interfere. In contemporary life, children are no longer seen as the property of 
their parents or carers and so the instruments of state and law enforcement must be brought to bear 
if a child’s welfare is endangered..  
   In terms of how the duty to protect privacy is distributed, we need to debate the structure of dele-
gating morality to technology. In times of moral uncertainty, following in the wake of the terrible 
tragedies such as the cases I describe, we are tempted to delegate too much to technological devices. 
For instance, a  high profile UK robotocist made the serious suggestion, in the wake of the Soham 
murders, that children could be implanted with microchips so that they might be tracked if abducted 
and some parents have clearly considered this as a serious possibility5. Recognizing that such ac-
                                                           
4 A. Adam, Gender, Ethics and Information Technology. Palgrave Macmillan, Houndmills, Basingstoke, 2005. 
 
5 G. Kewney. No, Mrs Duval, You CANNOT Track a Mobile Human by Wireless Like a Car! 
http://www.newswireless.net/index.cfm/article/548,  available online, accessed 23rd March, 2005, 2002. 
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tions are often prompted by fear rather than an attempt to sidestep parenting duties, nevertheless 
delegating so much of the moral duty of care to a subcutaneous microchip, even if it worked, does 
not absolve us of the responsibility for looking after our children and others’ children and the need 
to teach our children to look after themselves.  
   Furthermore, in a children’s database it is vital that data is accurate. In the UK there have been 
some high profile cases of carers being wrongly accused of murder or abuse. Wrong accusations can 
be devastating for a family. The blunt instrument of a gigantic database cannot ensure that data is 
accurate, nor that it will be interpreted in a fair and reasonable way. Such a database cannot get 
round some of the issues that have dogged tragic cases where authorities have not acted to save the 
child involved, where lack of resources, inadequate training and overstretched staff may outweigh 
the positive benefits of a database. Finally, it is difficult to see how the Soham tragedy might have 
been averted by such a database as information retention of data on those who might harm children, 
rather than on the children themselves, was required here. At the same time we must ensure the 
accuracy of such data and that it is shared with appropriate authorities.  
DELEGATION TO MACHINES – WHAT CAN BE DELEGATED AND HOW? 
The Soham and Climbie cases and the above consideration of the ways in which we cannot take a 
purely instrumental view of databases demonstrate that a theoretical framework for the twin aspects 
of delegation and distribution of morality must be developed, particularly with respect to the key 
moral concept of privacy. 
   Considering delegation first, there is a strong sense in which delegation to a machine is prosaic. 
Indeed the history of technology is strewn with our attempts to delegate to machines activities which 
they can perform better or quicker than we do. A sewing machine sews faster and more accurately 
than I do; a bicycle will take me to work more quickly than my feet can. Some sorts of delegation, 
therefore, seem uncontroversial, or at least, uncontroversial in the present day. Even so, we must 
recall that a delegation which now seems uncontroversial may have been viewed as problematic in 
the past. Most obviously, history offers many examples of concerns over the introduction of ma-
Delegating and Distributing Morality 
   
chinery into the workplace which was negatively regarded as reducing the need for skilled labour, 
for example as in cloth production in the industrial revolution and in office automation the 1970s 
and 1980s. It is the art of making these apparently prosaic delegations “strange”, and opening the 
black boxes of technologies for inspection6 that historians, sociologists and philosophers have at-
tended to over the last thirty or more years. 
   Without going into these complex historical examples in any detail, they nevertheless demonstrate 
that, while we may be able to delegate certain things previously done by people, to machines, we 
may not always want to, or, at least, we may want to consider the conditions under which we would 
wish to make such delegations. Alongside hopes for technologies to make life easier and less tedious 
there are always fears that technologies will have a negative impact. In historical examples, it may 
be fears about machines taking away the need for human labour whilst in modern times such fears 
may be expressed in terms of machines taking away aspects of humanity or lessening “moral capi-
tal”. We could, for example, regard the database for children as lessening the mortal capital amongst 
humans i.e. parents, carers, health and social services officials whilst increasing the moral capacity 
of the database which has the requirement to protect privacy delegated to it.  This may help to ex-
plain the apparent  paradox that we are sometimes willing to place enormous trust in the moral ca-
pacity of a machine as in the example of embedding microchips in children. 
   In any case, are there limits on the sorts of activities that we may delegate to a machine, and if 
there are limits how might these apply to delegation of morality and, in particular, privacy? The 
sociologist of science, Collins7 thinks that there are limits to delegation. Although he says little 
about delegation of morality, as such, it is nevertheless useful to understand his approach partly 
because it provides a detailed analysis of the kinds of activities which may or may not be open to 
delegation, partly because he does consider delegation of morality, albeit briefly, and also because 
                                                           
6 L. Winner. Upon Opening the Black Box and Finding it Empty: Social Constructivism and the Philosophy of 
Technology. Science, Technology & Human Values, 18(3): 362—378, 1993. 
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his work provides a useful bridge between potentially disparate positions exemplified in Floridi and 
Saunders and the actor-network approach8. His position has been developed through research on the 
complexities of replication in scientific experiment9, which he later developed into an analysis of 
what counts as replication of action more generally, through an analysis of what computers can and 
cannot do10 and a more formal description of the kinds of human activity that can be delegated to 
machines11. 
   In terms of how far humans can delegate acts to machines, he claims:  
“We cannot delegate acts, we can only delegate the behavioral coordinates of the act and 
we can delegate these successfully just to the extent that part of the act is sufficiently styl-
ised to be reducible to one behavior and describable without loss to a formula.” 12 
   In particular, it is mimeomorphic action which may be delegated to machine, where mimeomor-
phic actions are to be understood as “..actions where exact reproduction of the behavior by someone 
who did not understand the action would always appear to reproduce the action to someone who 
did understand the action.” 13 By contrast, polimorphic actions are characterized by varying behav-
iours in carrying out an action in a given situation e.g. writing a love letter. Polimorphic actions 
require the agent to have cultural knowledge to understand what counts as appropriate action in a 
given circumstance. Indeed one needs a great deal of cultural knowledge to know what counts as 
‘the same’ given the variability of polimorphic action involved in carrying out a particular act. Such 
actions may not be successfully delegated to a machine. 
                                                                                                                                                                 
7 H.M. Collins. Artificial Experts: Social Knowledge and Intelligent Machines, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 
1990. 
8 L. Floridi and J.W. Sanders. On the Morality of Artificial Agents. M. Akrich. The De-Scription of Technical 
Objects.. B. Latour. Where are the Missing Masses? The Sociology of a Few Mundane Artifacts.  
9 H.M. Collins. Changing Order: Replication  and Induction in Scientific Practice. Sage, London, Beverly 
Hills and New Dehli, 1985. 
10 H.M. Collins. Artificial Experts: Social Knowledge and Intelligent Machines, 
11 H.M. Collins and M. Kusch. The Shape of Actions: What Machines and Humans Can Do 
12 H.M. Collins. Artificial Experts: Social Knowledge and Intelligent Machines, 71. 
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   It is clear that delegation does not just mean delegation of “physical” actions as in the example of 
riding a bicycle. We have delegated arithmetic operations to machines for years; the subject of arti-
ficial intelligence, involves, to some extent, delegation parts of our thinking to machines. Prima 
facie, there seems no reason why delegating morality to a machine is inconceivable, although, under 
this view we would not be delegating the moral act, just the behavioural coordinates of the moral act 
e.g. checking a child’s welfare, ensuring that they attend school and so on.   
   Collins and Kusch14 do not regard the delegation of morality as an issue. Indeed they contend that 
delegation and moral responsibility are orthogonal. So, under this view, delegating the protection of 
privacy to a database for children does not mean that we are asking the database to assume moral 
responsibly. Delegating the behavioural parameters of a moral act is not the same thing as moral 
responsibility, yet it does appear to be something more than treating the database in a  purely in-
strumental, data storage way. Thinking of delegation to human actors for the moment, activities can 
be cascaded down a chain of action, including polimorphic activities, and actors at the bottom of the 
cascade do not necessarily need to understand the whole of the action to which they contribute e.g. 
as in times of war when a set of orders might be given without full information of the context, so 
long as the actors at the bottom of the cascade share a “form of life”, in other words sufficient 
shared cultural understanding, with those at the top of the cascade. Given that Collins and Kusch15 
argue that only mimeomorphic action can be delegated to machines it seems unlikely that they 
would argue that morality can be delegated to a machine, certainly in the sense of machines poten-
tially having moral responsibility and this is confirmed by the preceding ‘orthogonality’ argument. 
   In a similar vein, Floridi and Sanders16 do not regard the attribution of moral responsibility to 
artificial agents (machines, software, organizations) as an appropriate approach. However they do 
argue that artificial agents can engage in moral action and that our failure to fully explore this to 
                                                                                                                                                                 
13 H.M. Collins and M. Kusch. The Shape of Actions: What Machines and Humans Can Do, 21-22. 
14 H.M. Collins and M. Kusch. The Shape of Actions: What Machines and Humans Can Do, 62. 
15 H.M. Collins and M. Kusch. The Shape of Actions: What Machines and Humans Can Do. 
16 L. Floridi and J.W. Sanders. On the Morality of Artificial Agents. 
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date results from the constraints of overly anthropomorphic views of agenthood, especially in terms 
of intentionality, which have hitherto prevailed. 
 
INTENTIONALITY AND DELEGATION 
Such considerations raise the spectre of intentionality. Does morality require intentionality and 
therefore does intentionality have to be present in order to delegate morality, in other words must we 
limit morality to (intentional) humans? Floridi and Sanders17 think not. Now, he does not explicitly 
state this, but Collins does not appear very concerned with intentionality either. For instance, he 
does not regard arguments such as those of Searle18 on the Chinese Room, on preserving the spe-
cialness  of the human condition through the human only capacity for intentional behaviour, as es-
pecially relevant. Indeed he regards the puzzle that is to be explained by critiques of AI is the re-
markable way in which we successfully manage to accommodate machines into our culture – they 
are accepted as social prostheses rather than as brain prostheses. For Dennett19, who, unlike Collins, 
does consider intentionality directly, if it walks like a duck and quacks like a duck then it’s a duck, 
or at least we can treat it as if it is a duck. In other words if an artificial agent can be treated as if it 
has intentionality then we should not worry about what is inside. We do not have to worry about the 
specialness of the human condition and its unique capacity for intentionalility a la Searle; “as if” 
intentionality will do fine. 
   Arguments on intentionality, such as those above, have been used with regard to replicating hu-
man intelligence in AI but Floridi and Sanders want to argue, as indeed others do20, that the question 
of intentionality applies to ethics as much as epistemology. They appear to be in tune with Dennett’s 
approach to intentionality in that intentionality is not deemed necessary for the requirements of 
                                                           
17 L. Floridi and J.W. Sanders. On the Morality of Artificial Agents. 
18 J. R. Searle.  Minds, Brains and Programs. In R. Born, editor, Artificial  Intelligence: The Case Against, 
pages 18—40, Croom Helm, London and Sydney, 1987. 
19 D.C. Dennett. The Myth of Original Intentionality. In E. Dietrich, editor, Thinking Computers and Virtual 
Persons: Essays on the Intentionality of Machines, pages 91—107, Academic Press, San Diego, CA and 
London, 1994. 
20 J. Gips. Towards the Ethical Robot. In K.M. Ford, C. Glymour and P.J. Hayes, editors, Android Epistemol-
ogy, pages 243—252, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA and London, 1995. 
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interaction, autonomy and adaption which are necessary for something to qualify as an agent. Indeed 
they argue that the notion of intentionality presupposes privileged access to an agent’s mental state 
and therefore is overly psychological and individualistic in emphasis. Additionally, a satisfactory 
investigation of distributed morality, which will be important in what follows, is difficult to achieve 
when the focus is on the apparently individual psychology of intentionality. Therefore, Floridi and 
Sanders would seem to be in tune with Collins and Dennett in broadening the conception away from 
what may or may not go on inside the head. This allows for a more cultural approach to morality in 
terms of distributed morality.  
 
DISTRIBUTED MORALITY 
The concept of delegation of morality leads to a consideration of distributed morality as it allows us 
to attribute good or evil collectively, even globally (think of ecological concerns) without limiting 
discussion to individual agents. Apart from getting away from individual psychology, and the poten-
tial solipsism of intentionality, this allows a more systemic approach towards morality which can 
attach to artificial agents and mixtures of artificial and human agents (as in the combination of or-
ganizations and, for instance, humans and databases). 
   In particular, Floridi and Sanders21 emphasize the way in which artificial agents can perform mor-
ally relevant activity independently of their human creators. One thinks of Frankenstein’s monster as 
the ultimate (if rather unfortunate) example. Artificial agents can be sources of good or evil, and can 
potentially be re-engineered to be good but it makes no sense to try to attribute moral responsibility 
to them. Essentially, their approach enlarges the class of moral agents to include those that are arti-
ficial; as I discuss below, this is definitely in tune with the ‘seamless web’ approaches, which ad-
dress assemblages of human and non-human actors. 
   Collins’s approach is somewhat different from the “seamless web” approach of actor-network 
theory. There was something of a split in social constructivist approaches to the study of technology 
                                                           
21 L. Floridi and J.W. Sanders. On the Morality of Artificial Agents. 
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in the early 1990s with Collins22 retaining the human at the centre of purposeful activity, whilst 
seamless web approaches argued for the decentring of the human where humans and things (includ-
ing machines) are to be seen as networked together and where action arises from the network. With-
out rehearsing the complexities of this debate, for the purposes of the present paper we should note 
that delegation is tackled somewhat differently under the seamless web approach. Where Collins 
regards delegation of morality as tangential to delegation of activity, authors working under the 
banner of actor-network theory, the classic seamless web approach, where the separation of human 
and non-human is not contentious, do not have difficulty in envisaging the delegation of morality to 
a machine or non-human actor. 
   For instance, Latour23 describes a number of delegations which clearly involve a delegation and 
distribution of morality through networks of humans and non-humans. Car set belts are a delegation 
of safety, and perhaps morality, in their insistence, through flashing lights, alarms and even disem-
bodied voices, that we buckle up before we drive off so that we attend to our own safety, and that of 
others, through the restraining actions we delegate to seat belts. Hence they make us obey the law 
and attend to safety, ours and others; in a minimal way they make us good citizens whether we like 
it or not. Latour24 asks where the morality is in this assembly of driver and car.  
“Where is the morality? In me, a human driver, dominated by the mindless power of an ar-
tifact? Or in the artifact forcing me, a mindless human, to obey the law…impossible to 
drive without wearing the belt.. I, plus the car, plus the dozens of patented engineers, plus 
the police are making me be moral.” 
   Latour invokes the analogy of the ‘”missing mass” that cosmologists look for in explaining the 
workings of the universe. Sociologists also seek their “missing mass”.  
“They are constantly looking, somewhat desperately, for social links sturdy enough to tie 
all of us together or for moral laws that would be inflexible enough to make us behave 
                                                           
22 H.M. Collins, and S. Yearley. Epistemological Chicken. In A. Pickering, editor, Science as Practice and 
Culture, pages 301—326,  University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London, 1992. 
23 B. Latour. Where are the Missing Masses? The Sociology of a Few Mundane Artifacts. 
24 B. Latour. Where are the Missing Masses? The Sociology of a Few Mundane Artifacts, 225-226. 
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properly. When adding up social ties, all does not balance, Soft humans and weak morali-
ties are all sociologists can get… Something is missing, something that should be strongly 
social and highly moral… To balance our accounts of society, we simply have to turn our 
exclusive attention away from humans and look also at nonhumans. Here they are, the hid-
den and despised social masses who make up our morality. They knock at the door of soci-
ology, requesting a place in the accounts of society as stubbornly as the human masses did 
in the nineteenth century.”25 
   Latour is arguing, not just that we can treat nonhuman actors as sources of morality, but that the 
morality is completely delegated all the way through our networks of human and non human actors 
so that morality is strongly distributed through these assemblages. The seat belt is but one examples. 
Latour’s notorious automatic door closer which “goes on strike” at La Halle aux Cuirs is another, 
which permits him to muse on the delegation to door hinges “the work of reversibly solving the 
wall-hole dilemma.” 26 
   Lest we should imagine that the delegation of actions and even morality is a one way process 
Latour notes that we could have delegated door closing to all the people who enter and leaving the 
building, or to a paid porter (as in one of the more expensive department stores), who is unlikely to 
be paid well enough to attend properly to a boring, underpaid job. We may try to discipline unruly 
humans by making them close the door or we substitute for human frailty a delegated nonhuman 
character, an automatic door closer or, as the French call it a “groom.” 
   The “wall-hole’ dilemma” is not quite solved as we may have put a lot of human door closers out 
of work. Although this example is somewhat whimsical this point does echo perennial concerns 
about technology putting people out of work. Additionally the nonhuman groom prescribes back 
certain skills on the human user. A highly sprung door closer slams the door impolitely so humans 
must be skilled at getting through without injury, so there is always a trade-off between skills of a 
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human and nonhuman. Behaviour is prescribed back onto the human by the nonhuman. In appropri-
ate circumstances, nonhumans make us behave properly. 
“Prescription is the moral and ethical dimension of mechanisms. In spite of the constant 
weeping of moralists, no human is as relentlessly moral as a machine. We have been able to 
delegate to nonhumans not only force as we have known it for centuries but also values, du-
ties and ethics. It is because of this morality that we, humans, behave so ethically, no matter 
how weak and wicked we feel we are. The hydraulic groom or door closer illustrates this 
well. It shows in its humble way how three rows of delegated nonhuman actants (Hinges, 
springs and hydraulic pistons) replace, 90 percent of the time, either an undisciplined bell-
boy who is never there when needed or, for the general public, the program instructions 
that have to do with remembering-to-close-the-door-when-it-is-cold.”27 
   Similarly, Akrich28 describes the way in which technological objects define actants and the rela-
tionships between actants which is partly a function of decisions made by designers. Designers make 
decisions about what should be delegated to whom or what and this produces “a specific geography 
of responsibilities.”29 Akrich also argues that moral judgments are made in this process. Designers 
‘inscribe’ a view of the world in the technical content of new artefacts.  As she notes, the adjustment 
between the user imagined by the designer and the real user sometimes results in unexpected things. 
This is an important point for the present study. Actors can be enrolled. For instance, on the Ivory 
Coast, where, pre-electrification, only a minority of workers paid income tax, as an electricity net-
work was introduced, the electricity bill became the means of collecting local taxes.30 The electricity 
network was, therefore, making its subscribers into good citizens by making them pay their taxes. 
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   More explicitly than Latour, Akrich31 argues that devices installed by designers can control moral 
behaviour of users. “..devices may measure behavior, place it in a hierarchy, control it, express the 
fact of submission, and distribute causal stories and sanctions.”  
 
SUMMARIZING DELEGATION OF MORALITY 
In the preceding sections I discuss three broadly different approaches to delegation of action, and 
within that, delegation of morality, to nonhuman agents. As philosophers, Floridi and Saunders32 
believe it is eminently possible to imbue an artificial agent with morality so it may perform morally 
relevant actions independently of its human creator. They introduce an important concept for the 
present study, that of “distributed morality”, which captures the idea that moral activity does not just 
attach to humans or artificial agents as individuals, rather it may be distributed through societies, 
organizations and networks of artificial and human agents. 
   As a sociologist of science and technology, Collins working with philosopher, Kusch33 is con-
cerned with detailed actions that can be delegated or cascaded down from one group of actors  to 
another without loss of meaning. Collins and Kusch are not specifically concerned with morality, 
regarding it as somewhat tangential to their detailed research on polimorphic and mimeomorphic 
actions.  Akrich and Latour, as sociologists of technology from the seamless web approach regard 
morality as thoroughly delegable. Morality is inscribed in Latour’s34 seatbelts and door closers and 
in Akrich’s35 electricity networks, electricity meters and photovoltaic cells. Human and nonhuman 
actors are held in a web of moral relationship. Under such a model, we could consider aspects of 
privacy as inscribed in the database for children. 
   However there are some fundamental differences in approach to be found amongst these authors. 
For instance, Collins wants to keep the human at the centre of the network36 whilst Latour37, in par-
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ticular, argues to decentre the human in order that humans and nonhumans can be treated alike for 
sociological description. Nevertheless there is a, perhaps, surprising degree of useful commonality 
between their approaches which can be distilled into the present discussion. 
   First of all, as noted above, none of these authors appears to regard intentionality as an issue, 
Dennett’s38 arguments on “as if” intentionality dovetail in here nicely, and this permits us to move 
away from anthropomorphic views of moral action allowing us to include nonhuman actors or artifi-
cial agents, in the shape of machines, databases or whatever into our purview of meaningful moral 
action. Secondly, “distributed morality” comes to the fore as a highly useful concept permitting 
synergies between the work of Floridi and Sanders and Latour and Akrich (admittedly Collins does 
not consider this issue). The interesting point is that authors coming from different directions arrive 
at philosophically similar frameworks, although they develop their approaches differently. Combin-
ing these approaches, I argue that the concept of distributed morality offers fruitful ways of thinking 
about the ways in which morality is spread through networks of human and nonhuman actors (ma-
chines, databases etc), how we delegate morality to nonhuman actors and how they delegate moral-
ity back to us. 
   How may these considerations be applied to the current case study? In this example I am consider-
ing the delegation of morality, and, in particular, privacy, as embodied in a particular set of legisla-
tion, namely. the UK Data Protection Act, to a database. The morality is distributed through the 
network of the people who protect personal data from being wrongly accessed, the people who must 
judge when to make personal data available and the database which, through its holding of personal 
data records, has morality delegated to it and inscribed in it. The database can exert controls over 
people through the actions of those who may or may not retrieve personal data. Personal data may 
be withheld, reflecting the broad principle that personal data is private to the individual concerned 
and should not be revealed. However, sometimes personal data should be revealed, as in the cases 
described above, when a life is at risk if the normal expectation of privacy is not overruled. 
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   A specific, and potentially important difference between Floridi and Saunders39 and Latour40 
emerges here. Floridi and Sanders require their agents to have quite a high level of agency to qualify 
as artificial agents, in terms of interaction, autonomy and adaption. Understandably, they may have 
difficulty accepting a database of personal data as qualifying for the attribution of artificial agency. 
However if we adopt the seamless web approach, exemplified by Latour and Akrich41, we do not 
have to have to attribute high levels of autonomy to artificial agents as morality is distributed 
throughout the network. Additionally, the idea of inscription is useful. The designer of a technology 
inscribes morality into its design whether it involves paying electricity bills, fastening seatbelts or 
handling personal data in such a  way that privacy is protected appropriately. Meaningful moral 
activity may be achieved, therefore, without a high degree of agency. 
 
CONCLUSION 
If one child’s life is saved through the development of the children’s database it might seem com-
pletely inappropriate to criticize the concept. However I am arguing that part of the problem is our 
failure to delegate attention to privacy in such a way that protecting privacy is distributed in an 
appropriately balanced way throughout our network of humans and nonhumans. We need the non-
humans. We have database and other information and communications technologies that we can use 
to increase our moral well being. However we cannot delegate all our moral duties to them as we 
may be tempted to do when we are made fearful for the well-being of our children.  We have to 
balance the distribution of morality through the network of humans and nonhumans. As Latour42 
demonstrates with his automatic door-closer, we have to learn to accommodate the properties of the 
door-closer. If we approach the door too slowly, and the door closer is brisk, we end up with a 
bloody nose. If the door-closer is too slow, we end up with a chilly room. Similarly, we must learn 
                                                           
39 L. Floridi and J.W. Sanders. On the Morality of Artificial Agents. 
40 B. Latour. Where are the Missing Masses? The Sociology of a Few Mundane Artifacts, 
41 B. Latour. Where are the Missing Masses? The Sociology of a Few Mundane Artifacts, M. Akrich. The De-
Scription of Technical Objects. 
 
42 B. Latour. Where are the Missing Masses? The Sociology of a Few Mundane Artifacts, 
Delegating and Distributing Morality 
   
to accommodate the moral properties of a database. Although we have inscribed various aspects of 
the protection of privacy to databases, they prescribes back to us various activities. These include 
keeping data on offenders, when the offence involves abuse of children or adults, sharing such data 
across different local authorities and police forces when an offender applies for a job involving 
children, keeping an appropriately balanced  check on child welfare through the database for chil-
dren and so on. 
   In this paper I have considered the question of delegation of morality to machines, with the aim of 
opening up debate as to how we should view the delegation of morality to databases where the data-
base contains personal data protected by data protection law. The arguments of Floridi and Sand-
ers43 suggest that artificial agents can perform independent, morally relevant action. As a sociologist 
of science and technology and philosopher, respectively, Collins and Kusch44 demonstrate that cer-
tain actions can be cascaded down a chain as long as the actors, including artificial actors, share a 
“form of life”. Although they do not see their arguments as especially relevant to moral responsibil-
ity, their views coupled with those of Floridi and Saunders, Latour and Akrich45 from the “seamless 
web” approach strongly suggest that intentionality is not an issue in regard to delegation of morality. 
Indeed it appears to be an overly psychological and anthropomorphic concept which presupposes 
privileged access to an agent’s mental states. Instead Floridi and Sanders46 emphasize the notion of 
distributed morality which accords with Latour’s47 view of humans and nonhumans acting in a net-
work where the morality is distributed through the network. 
   The latter view is particularly pertinent when we consider ways in which protection of private data 
is delegated to a database and where failure to share or retain data contributed to a series of trage-
dies involving the murder of children. Panic reactions to such tragedies sometimes result in our 
considering delegating too much morality to a machine as in the suggestion that microchips could be 
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implanted in children as tracking devices. On the other hand with powerful database and informa-
tion technologies available to us why should we not use these to increase the ‘moral capital’ of our 
society of humans and nonhumans through an appropriate balance of distributed morality, especially 
as it applies to protection of privacy? 
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